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Book Reviews
JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMIT-
MENT TO REPRESENTATIVE JURIES. By John M. Van Dyke.*
Ballinger Publishing Company, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 1977.
Pp. 426.
Jury Selection Procedures is an ambitious examination of the
status of the jury in the American legal system. Professor Van Dyke
has surveyed the current procedures for selecting juries in the state
and federal courts, compared these procedures with Constitutional
and Supreme Court guidelines, and has offered his recommendations
for achieving truly representative juries.
The U.S. Constitution is, unfortunately, silent on the subject of
jury selection. The sixth amendment does require that juries in
federal courts be "impartial."1 This requirement has also been
applied to state courts, through the selective incorporation doctrine
and the fourteenth amendment. 2 The problem of how an impartial
jury is to be selected remains an issue, however.
The Supreme Court has stated that in order for the jury to be an
"instrument" of "public justice," it must be "a body truly representa-
tive of the community,"3 and that it should be a "cross section of the
community. ' 4 The general public includes many minorities and
persons biased in every way possible. Therefore, to accurately
represent their community, juries should not be limited to the white
male middle class.
Professor Van Dyke offers convincing statistics that indicate
that our nation's juries are not truly representative of the communi-
ties in which they are located. Studies conducted in state and federal
courts across the country show that blue collar workers, 5 non-
whites,6 the young and the elderly 7 and women 8 are all underrepre-
sented to varying degrees.
Operating from the premise that juries should "reflect the
complex fabric of society as faithfully as possible,"9 Professor Van
Dyke makes wide-ranging suggestions for improving jury selection
procedures. He divides the process of jury selection into three stages,
and points out the difficulties at each stage.
The first stage is the assembly of a master list of eligible
individuals. Congress has provided that Federal jury "wheels" are to
* Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law, University of California.
1. U.S. CONST. amend VI.
2. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
3. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
4. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942).
5. J.M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT
TO REPRESENTATIVE JURIES at app. F, 293-310 (1977) [hereinafter VAN DYKE].
6. Id. at app. G, 311-30.
7. Id. at app. H, 332-47.
8. Id. at app. I, 350-71.
9. Id. at 23.
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be compiled from the list of registered voters in each jurisdiction,
supplemented by additional lists where necessary to achieve a "fair
cross-section of the community." 10 Most states also use voters' lists
as a basis.1 1 It is argued that non-whites, the young and blue collar
workers are all underrepresented on voter registration lists simply
because these groups register to vote less often. In order to achieve a
more valid cross section of the community, Professor Van Dyke
suggests that voter registration be simplified. He also states that the
voters' lists should be supplemented by other lists, such as the list of
licensed drivers in a jurisdiction and the census rolls.
The second problem area in the jury selection process occurs
after potential jurors have been randomly selected from the jury
wheel. Sixty percent of these potential jurors request excusal from
jury service for such reasons as economic hardship, illness, problems
with child care, and transportation difficulties.1 2 Van Dyke attacks
the liberal way in which requests for excusal are granted. He argues
that the persons to whom these excuses are offered will usually take
advantage of the offer. Since jury service involves a major
commitment of time, but provides only minimal financial rewards,
usually only those who are required to serve will do so.
The groups of people who qualify for excusal from jury service
are to a large degree those which are already underrepresented on
the master jury wheel. The excuse of economic hardship is
particularly applicable to the young, blue collar workers and others
receiving hourly wages. Women with children are excused almost
automatically. The elderly are also granted excuses by statute in
twenty-eight states, and by practice in most of the other jurisdic-
tions.
Professor Van Dyke advocates easing the economic burden on
jurors while tightening and standardizing the requirements for
excusal from jury service. He believes that the daily monetary
allowance should be raised and that the length of the term of service
should be reduced. He also advises granting allowances for child
care and transportation or lodging expenses in those instances
warranting such measures. Van Dyke argues that this dual program
of making jury duty more attractive but also more difficult to avoid,
will result in more minorities appearing in the jury box.
The third stage at which fault is found in the jury selection
process involves challenges. Professor Van Dyke advocates a
modification of the current system of peremptory challenges and
challenges for cause. The purpose of challenges for cause is to
remove those potential jurors who have demonstrated certain biases.
The problem with this type of challenge is that every human being
has biases of some sort. In fact, the reason for wanting a
10. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1869 (1976).
11. VAN DYKE, supra note 5, at app. A, 258-62.
12. Id. at 111.
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representative cross-section of the community is so that these biases
will balance out each other. When one set of biases is completely
eliminated, the jury becomes less representative. The author
therefore favors limiting the scope of voir dire questioning to
determining whether potential jurors have any specific biases
toward a particular case, e.g., to ascertaining if a juror is acquainted
with a party. Successful challenges for cause would be required to
show this type of specific bias.
Van Dyke contends that the number of peremptory challenges
should also be reduced. These challenges are seen as tools by which
each attorney seeks to achieve a jury biased in his favor by
eliminating those jurors whom he thinks may favor his opponent's
case. This practice means that the resulting jury will be less
representative than the panel which is first sent into the courtroom.
If abused, the procedure can also serve to eliminate a certain
segment of the population from jury duty. The appellant in Swain v.
Alabama,13 a young black, argued this point when he complained
that, although an average of six or seven blacks usually appeared on
a trial jury list, not one black person had served on a criminal jury in
his jurisdiction in fifteen years. The Supreme Court ruled however,
that to constitute a reversible error, the burden was on the accused to
prove a deliberate and systematic exclusion of a race no matter what
the crime, the defendant, or the circumstances. 14
Professor Van Dyke believes that the number of peremptory
challenges should be reduced for the accused and reduced or
eliminated for the prosecution. 15 He also suggests that once the
accused presents a prima facie case of improper exclusion in his
trial, the burden of proof should shift to the prosecutor to explain
how this has occurred.' 6
The premise that runs through all of Van Dyke's suggestions is
that jury selection should be based on a truly random selection from
the community at large. He cautions that two recent developments -
the acceptance of juries of less than twelve and less than unanimous
verdicts - detracts from the goals sought. When juries of six17 are
permitted, he argues, there is even less of a chance for minorities to
reach the jury box. When 9-3 decisions are accepted,' 8 the minorities
who do succeed in being accepted for jury service have less of a
chance of controlling the verdict. It is argued that by allowing these
trends, the Supreme Court has even further reduced the voice
afforded minorities in the jury system.19
13. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
14. Id. at 223-24.
15. VAN DYKE, supra note 5, at 166-68.
16. Id. at 167.
17. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
18. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
19. VAN DYKE, supra note 5, at 214.
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In summary, Jury Selection Procedures is an appeal by the
author for a revamping of our current procedures. Professor Van
Dyke has very effectively pointed out the problems which exist. The
evidence, as provided in the text and the appendices to the book,
clearly indicates that our current system is not as faithful to the
concept of representative juries as it should be.
The author has also provided his recommendations for correct-
ing these three problem areas. His suggestions, wide-ranging and
expansive in nature, are not as convincingly presented as they
might have been. Instead of showing how he believes the changes
should be enacted, Professor Van Dyke merely lists possible reforms.
All of these recommendations merit consideration, but there is no
indication as to the priority he gives each suggestion. Without this,
the book loses some of its vigor and continuity. Instead of being a
campaign for an integrated series of reforms, it is simply a list of
possible measures that may work in certain instances. The reader is
left to determine his own set of priorities.
The book also lacks continuity in the Postscript, in which the
author discusses jury nullification. The topic of jury nullification
instructions is not dealt with to any degree in the book until the
Postscript. Because of this, the impact of the author's discussion is
lessened. The reader is forced to wonder why, if the topic is so
important, it was not more effectively covered in the main text. The
result is a lack of cohesiveness.
Jury Selection Procedures, when accepted as an historical study
of the evolution of the jury in our current system, is a valuable
contribution to society. It is written without too much technical
language, so that it can be understood by most readers. This is
beneficial, since only through widespread understanding of current
problems in jury selection procedures can the type of reforms that
Professor Van Dyke advocates be enacted.
G. Mitchell Mowell
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